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OHIO SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT POLICEMEN
WHO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY UNDER
AUTHORITY OF LAW ARE LICENSEES
Scheurer v. Trustees of the Open Bible Church
175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38 (1963)
Plaintiff policeman sued for personal injuries sustained when he fell
into an unguarded, open excavation on defendants' premises while investi-
gating at night a radio call that "kids" were breaking into defendants' church
building.' Jury trial was waived, and a three-judge court found for plaintiff,
awarding damages of $7,500. The court of appeals affirmed the decision. The
Supreme Court of Ohio, with two justices dissenting, reversed, holding that
the duty of care owed a policeman in the performance of his duties is that
owed a licensee 2
Although the instant case is one of first impression in Ohio,3 the
majority opinion follows the law of most American jurisdictions.4 The rule
goes back to the feudal concept that landowners, being the backbone of
society, were sovereign within their own boundaries and owed only a bare
minimum of duty to outsiders.5
Society has changed greatly since the feudal era-from the loosely knit
social structure caused by each manor having its own self-sustained economy
to the closely knit, interdependent society of an industrial economy; from a
society where self-help was the rule to one where self-help is the exception
and reliance upon the state is the rule. Unfortunately, the law has not changed.
The majority of courts do not afford policemen the stafidard of reasonable
care due invitees. Rather they are treated as licensees. The licensor owes
them the duty to refrain from wantonly or wilfully injuring them, to exer-
cise ordinary care after discovering them in a position of peril, and to refrain
from exposing them to hidden dangers. 6 The rationale is that they may enter
the premises at unpredictable times and locations and that it would place an
undue burden upon the owner of the premises to afford policemen the duty of
ordinary care.7 However, the growing interdependence of our present society
1 The excavation was near the end of a driveway which led to the side door of
the church. A light above the door usually illuminated this area, but on the night of the
accident the light was not lit. The plaintiff was to enter the side door while his partner
entered the front door. There was no finding of negligence on plaintiff's part.
2 Scheurer v. Trustees of the Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38
(1963).
8 Id. at 166, 192 N.E.2d at 40.
4 Prosser, Torts § 78, at 461 (2d ed. 1955); 2 Harper & James, Torts § 27.14,
at 1501 (1956). See also Eckert v. Refiners Oil Co., 17 Ohio App. 221 (1923) for
general law as to firemen. Contra, Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
5 Dini v. Naiditch, supra note 4; see 2 Harper & James, oP. cit. supra note 4, § 27.1.
6 Hannan v. Ehrlich, 102 Ohio St. 176, 131 N.E. 504 (1921).
7 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 4, § 78; 2 Harper & James, op. cit. supra note 4,
§ 27.14.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
requires a reappraisal of the duty owed a policeman who enters private
property under authority of law.
The Supreme Court of Ohio had the opportunity for reappraisal, but
relied instead upon an historical approach to the problem. The majority did
concede two major issues however: (1) that the reasoning behind the law
does not have as much force today as it did in earlier cases, and (2) that
policemen should not be required to bear the burden of the loss incurred
as a result of their injuries.8 The majority of the court treated the second
issue as a policy question decided by the Ohio legislature through the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The majority's opinion was that this legisla-
tion provided that the burden of loss was to be spread throughout society and
was not to be placed upon the landowner. 9 This view takes no cognizance of
the possible culpability of the landowner nor of the distribution of loss
according to fault. In fact, the majority's argument is contra to prior Supreme
Court of Ohio decisions which granted relief to plaintiffs who had recovered
previously under Workmen's Compensation.' 0 The use of this inapposite
argument as one of the two surviving and presently forceful policy reasons
for not imposing liability upon the landowner indicates the injustice of this
decision.
Further, the court did not answer squarely the question of whether or
not there was an implied invitation for the plaintiff to use the driveway to
enter the defendants' property. The "ultimate fact" question of express
or implied invitation is to be decided by the jury in Ohio." In the instant
case, the three-judge court found that there were facts which in the law con-
stituted an implied invitation. The supreme court either ignored the ques-
tion of the implied invitation, or reversed the trial court's finding as against
the law. If the latter is true, the court should have been explicit in its finding.
Judge Gibson in a dissenting opinion examined the doctrinal basis of
the law, then criticized the distinction between classifying garbage collectors
as business guests and policemen as "mere" licensees, arguing that the social
justification for such a distinction has long since disappeared. Judge Gibson
concluded that the distinction should be eliminated.12 However, this approach
would hold property owners liable for injuries occurring at any point upon
S Scheurer v. Trustees of the Open Bible Church, supra note 2, at 168-69, 192
N.E.2d at 42.
0 Id. at 169, 192 N.E.2d at 42.
10 Id. at 177, 192 N.E.2d at 46-47 (Gibson, J., dissenting); George v. City of
Youngstown, 139 Ohio St. 591, 41 N.E.2d 567 (1942); Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co. v.
Shachovsky, 111 Ohio St. 791, 146 N.E. 306 (1924).
"1 Pennsylvania R.R. v. Vitti, 111 Ohio St. 670, 146 N.E. 94 (1924) (Involving a
policeman). The implied invitation is present when a person "has a right to understand
from the appearance of the premises that the intended mode of approach to the tene-
ment in question was over the open space . . . ." Learoyd v. Godfrey, 138 Mass. 315,
323-24 (1885) (Also involving a policeman).
12 Scheurer v. Trustees of the Open Bible Church, supra note 2, at 175-78, 192
N.E.2d at 45-47 (Gibson, J., dissenting). Judge Gibson's conclusion is based upon a
social analysis similar to this writer's.
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their premises. It would appear that a more reasonable approach to the
problem could be effected without unduly burdening property owners.
Since most jurisdictions refuse to grant relief in cases of this nature be-
cause it is uncertain when and where a policeman will enter private prop-
erty-the foreseeability argument of the Ohio Supreme Court, the best solu-
tion would appear to be a recognition that policemen and firemen who enter
private property under authority of law are neither invitees nor licensees,
but rather a class sui generis.13 The owner of private property should be held
to the exercise of reasonable care in the maintenance of all areas of his
property to which there is normal access by guests or invitees, a duty of care
now imposed in favor of meter readers and garbage collectors. The suggested
rule would not place too great a burden upon the property owner, but it
would prevent his unreasonable acts or omissions from causing undue hard-
ship to persons who are injured while performing public duties. Since the
performance of the public duty is as beneficial to the property owner as it is
to the community, the owner of private property should be held to the duty
of ordinary care toward public servants, such as policemen, who enter the
premises by normal means of ingress. In the instant case, plaintiff would have
recovered if the supreme court had adopted the suggested test.14 Since the
Supreme Court of Ohio will not remedy a patently unjust rule of law, the
Ohio Legislature should.
13 Shypuski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951);
see Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920); 2 Harper & James,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 27.14; Prosser, op. cit. supra note 4, § 78, at 460.
14 A similar result would have been reached if the court had rejected any distinction
between licensees and invitees, using instead the foreseeability test of Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), to determine whether these defendants
should have foreseen this plaintiff's falling into the unguarded, open excavation.
